Galactic Preservation And Beyond: A Framework For Protecting Cultural, Natural, And Scientific Heritage In Space by Rosendahl, Matthew
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 43 | Issue 3 Article 5
Galactic Preservation And Beyond: A Framework
For Protecting Cultural, Natural, And Scientific
Heritage In Space
Matthew Rosendahl
Copyright c 2019 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr
Repository Citation
Matthew Rosendahl, Galactic Preservation And Beyond: A Framework For Protecting Cultural, Natural,
And Scientific Heritage In Space, 43 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 839 (2019),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol43/iss3/5
GALACTIC PRESERVATION AND BEYOND: A
FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING CULTURAL, NATURAL,
AND SCIENTIFIC HERITAGE IN SPACE
MATTHEW ROSENDAHL*
INTRODUCTION
In July 2017, Moon Express, a private spaceflight company, an-
nounced plans to build an outpost on the South Pole of the Moon by 2020.1
The goal? To mine the Moon for minerals and water that could then be
sold for profit.2 Indeed, the Moon has been found to possess resources with
lucrative uses, both in space and here on Earth.3 The potential for huge
rewards has incentivized several private and governmental actors to launch
planned expeditions to the Moon, with China becoming the third nation
to land a spacecraft there in 2013.4 Both China and India have since an-
nounced plans to send robotic missions to the lunar surface,5 and the
United States recently renewed a pledge to once again land an astronaut
on the Moon.6
* JD 2018, summa cum laude, William & Mary Law School; BA 2015, magna cum laude,
College of William & Mary. I would like to thank the William & Mary Environmental
Law and Policy Review for their editing prowess, my family and friends for their support,
and Buzz Lightyear for sparking my interest in space at an early age.
1 Loren Grush, To mine the Moon, private company Moon Express plans to build a fleet of
robotic landers, VERGE (July 12, 2017, 11:32 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/7/12/159
58164/moon-express-robot-landers-private-mining-outpost [https://perma.cc/RPP9-CXYE].
2 Id.
3 These valuable resources are primarily water, helium-3, and rare earth metals. The
Lunar Gold Rush: How Moon Mining Could Work, NASA, https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/info
graphics/infographic.view.php?id=11272 [https://perma.cc/878U-DRDJ] (last visited Apr. 3,
2019); see also infra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
4 Kenneth Chang, The Google Lunar X Prize’s Race to the Moon Is Over. Nobody Won.,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/science/google-lunar-x
-prize-moon.html [https://perma.cc/53DY-U8AG]; Paul Rincon, China lands Jade Rabbit
robot rover on Moon, BBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-envi
ronment-25356603 [https://perma.cc/BFT3-FFPC].
5 Chang, supra note 4. For an overview of nations with lunar ambitions, see Benjamin D.
Hatch, Comment, Dividing the Pie in the Sky: The Need for a New Lunar Resources Regime,
24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 229, 237–43 (2010) (describing the ambitions of the United States,
Russia, China, Europe, India, and Japan).
6 See Joel Achenbach, NASA, heeding Trump, may add astronauts to a test flight moon
mission, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-of
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The Moon is not the only celestial goldmine, either. Billionaire Elon
Musk has stated that the exploitation of Mars will be necessary to create
a self-sustaining colony on the Red Planet.7 Certain ores could even be
mined and sent back to Earth for profit.8 And samples of Martian dust
and rock could sell for high prices to researchers and collectors.9 Although
less imminent than planned settlement and exploitation of the Moon, the
colonization of Mars has become an increasingly realistic probability. Sev-
eral private and governmental bodies have already announced planned
exploration and eventual settlement of our terrestrial neighbor.10
With galactic development on the horizon, legal scholars have ar-
gued that it is time to revisit international space law—grounded in Cold
War fears of an arms race in space—to create the necessary incentives for
private exploitation of our solar system.11 As it stands, the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty, the seminal treaty on space law, prohibits claims of national
-science/wp/2017/02/15/nasa-heeding-trump-considers-adding-astronauts-to-a-practice
-moon-mission/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e1c96b2bf384 [https://perma.cc/L2X7-653T]
(highlighting a recent push to make significant progress in putting an American astronaut
on the Moon within Trump’s first term).
7 Robert Walker, Is There A Fortune To Be Made On Mars?, FORBES (Sept. 26, 2016), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2016/09/26/is-there-a-fortune-to-be-made-on-mars/#29edb5
c76e28 [https://perma.cc/WMQ4-34A7].
8 See id. (“ ‘It has been shown that if concentrated supplies of metals of equal or greater
value than silver . . . were available on Mars, they could potentially be transported back
to Earth at high profit.’ ” (quoting Robert Zubrin, The Economic Viability of Mars Coloni-
zation, 48 J. BRIT. INTERPLANETARY SOC’Y 407 (1995))).
9 Id. (predicting prices in the billions for the first kilograms that return to Earth).
10 See, e.g., Kenneth Chang, Mars InSight: NASA’s Journey Into the Red Planet’s Deepest
Mysteries, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/30/science/mars
-insight-launch.html [https://perma.cc/N7NM-UJPH] (describing NASA’s latest mission
to explore beneath Mars’s surface); Ishaan Tharoor, U.A.E. plans Arab world’s first mission
to Mars, WASH. POST (July 16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/newsworldviews
/wp/2014/07/16/u-a-e-plans-arab-worlds-first-mission-to-mars/ [https://perma.cc/H52J
-RY7Q] (describing the United Arab Emirates’ plans to send an unmanned mission to
Mars in 2021); Mike Wall, SpaceX’s Mars Colony Plan: How Elon Musk Plans to Build
a Million-Person Martian City, SPACE.COM (June 14, 2017), https://www.space.com/37200
-read-elon-musk-spacex-mars-colony-plan.html [https://perma.cc/UTW7-G2XF].
11 See generally, e.g., John Adolph, The Recent Boom in Private Space Development and the
Necessity of an International Framework Embracing Private Property Rights to Encourage
Investment, 40 INT’L L. 961 (2006); Richard B. Bilder, A Legal Regime for the Mining of
Helium-3 on the Moon: U.S. Policy Options, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 243 (2010); David Collins,
Efficient Allocation of Real Property Rights on the Planet Mars, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L. 201 (2008); Hatch, supra note 5; John Myers, Comment, Extraterrestrial Property Rights:
Utilizing the Resources of the Final Frontier, 18 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 77 (2016); Jonathan
Thomas, Comment, Privatization of Space Ventures: Proposing a Proven Regulatory Theory
for Future Extraterrestrial Appropriation, 1 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 191 (2005).
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sovereignty or legal jurisdiction over any celestial body, creating legal
barriers for those wishing to extract the vast resources beyond Earth.12
This Article does not disagree with other scholars’ arguments for the pro-
motion of private industry in space—in fact, it endorses a new property
paradigm to remove the existing obstacles to extraction of galactic re-
sources. Instead, this Article considers the impacts of galactic exploitation
on celestial bodies and calls for the expansion of existing environmental
treaties, particularly those relating to preservation of cultural and natural
heritage,13 to restrict exploitive activities within certain areas of celestial
bodies that have significant cultural, scientific, or intrinsic value. This
Article is not the first to consider environmental preservation in space, nor
preservation of galactic heritage sites,14 but so far most scholarship on
this issue has focused on a regulate-as-you-go approach, or approaches that
are without the cumbersome burdens of international treaty-making.15
This Article adopts an alternative methodology.
12 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies arts. I, II, opened for signa-
ture Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967)
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
13 This Article pays particular attention to the Convention Concerning the Protection of
World Cultural and Natural Heritage, opened for signature Nov. 23, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37,
1037 U.N.T.S. 151 (entered into force Dec. 17, 1975) [hereinafter World Heritage Con-
vention], and the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage,
opened for signature Nov. 2, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 37 (entered into force Jan. 2, 2009) [hereinafter
Underwater Heritage Convention].
14 See, e.g., Mike Wall, Moon History: Group Works to Protect Apollo Landing Sites, SPACE
.COM (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.space.com/37799-apollo-landing-sites-preservation-for
-all-moonkind.html [https://perma.cc/ZL8R-4ZMJ] (describing efforts by “For All Moonkind,”
a nonprofit, to draft a treaty based on the World Heritage Convention that would protect
cultural sites on the Moon); see also Charles Cockell & Gerda Horneck, A Planetary Park
system for Mars, 20 SPACE POL’Y 291, 291–95 (2004) (proposing a parks system on Mars
to preserve areas of historic, natural, scientific, and future importance, but not proposing
a specific legal framework). This Article proposes something similar, but provides more
detail on the legal conceptualization of these ideas and argues that preservation should
be undertaken specifically within the UNESCO heritage framework. See infra Part V.
15 See generally, e.g., Lawrence D. Roberts, Ensuring the Best of All Possible Worlds: Envi-
ronmental Regulation of the Solar System, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 126 (1997); April Greene
Apking, Comment, The Rush to Develop Space: The Role of Spacefaring Nations in Forging
Environmental Standards for the Use of Celestial Bodies for Governmental and Private
Interests, 16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 429 (2005) (arguing that each nation, par-
ticularly spacefaring nations, should take responsibility for its own nationals and avoid
an international agreement for the time being); Kyle Ellis, Note, Preserving Apollo: H.R.
2617 and the Creation of the Apollo Lunar Landing Sites National Historic Park, 26 FORD-
HAM ENVTL. L. REV. 516 (2015) (calling for unilateral action by the United States to protect
the Apollo landing sites and dismissing international treaties as an impractical option).
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Rather than considering whether and how nations should and
could control the behavior of their nationals once they are beyond Earth’s
atmosphere, this Article calls for the laying of some ground rules before
the extraction of celestial resources begins. Specifically, it calls for mir-
roring the Convention concerning the Protection of World Cultural and
Natural Heritage (the “World Heritage Convention” or “WHC”) and its
underwater heritage companion (the “Underwater Heritage Convention”
or “UHC”) to establish an international body to promulgate regulations for
the preservation of galactic sites of universal cultural, natural, or scien-
tific value. In these so-called “galactic heritage sites,” nations would
agree to restrict the activities of their nationals, enforced by existing norms,
licensing regimes, and penalties. Although other areas of galactic bodies
would be opened for the purposes of resource extraction and human set-
tlement, these heritage sites would be largely off-limits. The Moon has
several cultural sites where nations have landed spacecraft, and even
human beings; Mars has areas that are favorable to the development and
existence of life, and both bodies have natural landmarks that are scien-
tifically and intrinsically significant. For these reasons, the time has come
to preserve the heritage of our galaxy before it is too late.
Part I will analyze the cultural, natural, and scientific significance
of the Moon, arguing why preservation of a lifeless body is worthwhile.
Part II will consider the importance of preserving Mars, particularly its
potentially life-harboring regions. And Part III will provide an overview
of the sources of international law currently governing space and their
shortcomings for the preservation of celestial bodies. Returning to Earth,
Part IV will evaluate the heritage conventions as a framework for pro-
tecting our galaxy. Finally, Part V will propose a solution, explaining why
international treaties on heritage preservation provide an ideal model for
the protection of celestial bodies. Ultimately, this Article proposes a frame-
work for galactic preservation that is cooperative and precautionary, and
that brings clear ground rules to an area currently in legal flux.
I. HERITAGE ON THE MOON: THE CASE FOR PRESERVING A LIFELESS
OBJECT
“Beautiful, beautiful. Magnificent desolation.” These were the
words of the second man on the Moon, Buzz Aldrin, as he stepped off the
Apollo 11 lunar lander.16 Although long-eclipsed by the famous “one small
16 Adam Mann, Space: The Final Frontier of Environmental Disasters?, WIRED (July 15,
2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/07/space-environmentalism/ [https://perma.cc/73S3
-TCWD].
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step” maxim, these words capture the competing perspectives on lunar
preservation. On the one hand, the Moon is an atmosphereless, lifeless ob-
ject whose value is mostly gravitational, contributing to the tides on Earth
and stabilizing our planet’s rotation.17 On the other hand, our Moon has
immense cultural and natural significance, and is home to landmarks of
human achievement.18 Upon closer examination, the Moon’s importance
to humanity and its own unique identity implore the preservation of at
least parts of the lunar surface.
A. Cultural Heritage on the Moon
The lunar surface is host to significant feats in human engineering
and innovation. Most notably, the six Apollo landing sites record the extent
of human exploration of our orbital partner.19 Unmanned landing sites,
including the landing sites of the Soviet Union’s Luna and the United
States’ Rover and Surveyor missions, also stretch across the lunar sur-
face.20 Of these sites, the Apollo 11 and Apollo 17 landings memorialize
particularly important events in human history, marking the first and last
times humans stepped foot on a celestial body.21 Fifty years later, the
17 See About the Moon, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., https://moon.nasa.gov/about
/in-depth/ [https://perma.cc/Q44S-2WS5] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019) [hereinafter About the
Moon](noting that “many missions that have explored the moon have found no evidence
to suggest it has its own living things”); Hanne Jakobsen, What would we do without the
moon?, SCIENCENORDIC (Jan. 12, 2012), http://sciencenordic.com/what-would-we-do-with
out-moon [https://perma.cc/GB9D-GM6A].
18 See generally EDGAR WILLIAMS, MOON: NATURE AND CULTURE (Daniel Allen ed., 2014).
19 See Apollo Landing Sites, NAT’L AIR & SPACE MUSEUM, https://airandspace.si.edu/ex
plore-and-learn/topics/apollo/apollo-program/landing-missions/sites.cfm [https://perma.cc
/38GA-QBFF] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019). For descriptions of the Apollo program and land-
ings, see WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 155–68.
20 See WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 149–54 (describing the unmanned missions to the Moon
launched by the Soviet Union and the United States between 1959 and 1967), 176 (de-
scribing the LCROSS and GRAIL probes, which were crashed into the lunar surface after
orbiting the Moon to collect data); see also NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., NASA’S
RECOMMENDATIONS TO SPACE FARING ENTITIES: HOW TO PROTECT AND PRESERVE THE
HISTORIC AND SCIENTIFIC VALUE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT LUNAR ARTIFACTS 17 (2011), https://
www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/617743main_NASA-USG_LUNAR_HISTORIC_SITES
_RevA-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/3N7Y-QP4E] [hereinafter NASA PRESERVATION REPORT].
21 Apollo 11 Landing Site, NAT’L AIR & SPACE MUSEUM, https://airandspace.si.edu/explore
-and-learn/topics/apollo/apollo-program/landing-missions/apollo11-landing-site.cfm
[https://perma.cc/44ZN-WXJV] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019); see also NASA PRESERVATION
REPORT, supra note 20, at 17. For a description of the Apollo 11 and 17 missions, see
WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 158–61, 165–68.
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original hardware and famous footprints of Earth’s first visitors to the
Moon remain at the Apollo 11 site.22
Many of the manned and unmanned landing sites also continue
to produce important data. Specifically, sensitive retroreflectors at three
Apollo sites and two Soviet Luna landing sites allow scientists to mea-
sure the distance between the Moon and Earth, and artifacts left on the
Moon’s surface provide valuable information about the effects of long-
term exposure to the lunar environment.23 The Apollo missions also left
behind seismometers to measure moonquakes.24
More recently, in 2013, China became the third nation to success-
fully land a spacecraft on the Moon, with the touchdown of its robotic
Chang’e 3 Yutu (or “Jade Rabbit”) rover.25 Although less significant than
the first manned and unmanned landing sites, Jade Rabbit could be pre-
served as part of the Moon’s cultural heritage, representing the first time
a nation other than a Cold War superpower has landed on the Moon.
The artifacts and equipment on the lunar surface highlight the
Moon’s cultural, historic, and scientific value. If one considers only the im-
portance of the Moon to mankind, then the justification for preservation
of at least some parts of it is amply supplied.26 If no part of the Moon is
protected, human exploitation risks damaging or destroying important
records of human achievement and useful scientific data. But the Moon is
not only important because of its value to humans; our orbital companion
also has an intrinsic, natural value that is worth protecting to some degree.
B. Natural Heritage on the Moon
Beyond the traces of human exploration on the Moon, the body is
itself home to astonishing, though desolate, natural beauty. The Moon is
a terrestrial body covered in craters, mountainous regions, valleys, and
grooves.27 Without weathering or any major seismological activity, these
features have remained relatively intact, providing a geologic timeline of
22 See NASA PRESERVATION REPORT, supra note 20, at 17. For an image of one of the
footprints left by the Apollo 11 astronauts, see WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 26.
23 See NASA PRESERVATION REPORT, supra note 20, at 5, 19–20.
24 See WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 160.
25 About the Moon, supra note 17.
26 See Valentina Vadi, The Cultural Wealth of Nations in International Law, 21 TUL. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 87, 96–97 (2012) (discussing the importance of cultural preservation as
a means to record human advancement and achieve “cultural empowerment”).
27 See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 18–23 (describing the geologic history of the
Moon and its features); Charles Q. Choi, Moon Facts: Fun Information About the Earth’s
Moon, SPACE.COM (Sept. 8, 2017, 6:45 PM), https://www.space.com/55-earths-moon-forma
tion-composition-and-orbit.html [https://perma.cc/7WWW-P5YK].
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the Moon’s past.28 Today, there are an estimated 300,000 impact craters on
the lunar surface.29 The largest of these craters, the Aitken Basin, formed
at the Moon’s South Pole, and is 2,500 kilometers (1,553 miles) across.30
The early volcanism of the Moon has also left distinctive, dark lava flows
across the Moon’s surface, called Maria (Mare in the singular), meaning
“seas,” after their water-like appearance.31 The Maria are broken up by
eighteen mountain ranges, several peaks of which reach over 3,000 meters
(9,842 feet) in elevation.32 The tallest lunar mountain is Mons Huygens,
at 4,700 meters (15,419 feet).33 The combination of two Maria—Mare Sere-
nitatis and Mare Imbrium—and the mountain range between them—
Montes Appeninus—form the familiar “Man in the Moon.”34
The Moon is also home to less familiar features. Rilles, for example,
are grooves in the lunar surface formed by lava flows, the collapse of impact
crater rims, and rifts.35 The largest rille, Rimae Pettit, is 450 kilometers
(280 miles) long.36 More intriguing are the lunar swirls: light patches
formed by “magnetic anomalies in the Moon’s structure.”37
Beneath its topographic features, the Moon’s crust holds an abun-
dance of natural resources. Although originally thought to be devoid of
water, scientists have since confirmed that water does exist on the lunar
surface, likely formed through the interaction of hydrogen in solar winds
and oxygen in lunar soil.38 The Moon also has an estimated 500,000 tons
of helium-3, much more than the store of helium-3 found on Earth—a
28 See WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 18–19. In fact, most of the large craters on the Moon
were formed during the “heavy bombardment” period, some 3.6 billion years ago. See
BERND BRUNNER, MOON: A BRIEF HISTORY 137 (2011).
29 WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 19. Unlike the mountains and hills on Earth, which have
been formed over many millennia, the highland areas of the Moon were formed rapidly
during asteroid impacts. Id.
30 Id. (noting also that the South Pole–Aitken basin is the largest basin in the solar system).
31 See id. at 19. There are twenty-two named “seas” and one named “ocean” on the Moon.
Id. at 29.
32 Id. at 22.
33 Id. This is compared to Mount Everest, the tallest mountain on Earth, whose elevation
“is widely recognized as 29,029 feet [8,848 meters].” Bhadra Sharma & Kai Schultz, How
Tall is Mount Everest?, For Nepal, It’s a Touchy Question, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/world/asia/mount-everest-how-tall-nepal.html [https://
perma.cc/F44N-ZEFU].
34 WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 29–30.
35 Id. at 22.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 22–23.
38 Id. at 23–24. In fact, the ice at the lunar south pole “is estimated to be tens of feet deep
and to cover a total area of thirty to fifty square miles.” Roberts, supra note 15, at 133.
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large incentive for private and governmental exploitation.39 And rare
metals, such as titanium, are present in greater amounts on the Moon
than in earthbound reserves.40
Evidently, the Moon possesses unique geologic and topographic
features that are both familiar to the naked observer and unlike anything
found on Earth. The absence of other life or the potential for it does lower
the moral impetus to preserve all parts of the Moon, and the abundance
of lunar resources incentivizes some degree of human exploitation, but
the aesthetic and intrinsic value of the Moon’s features are worth at least
some degree of international protection.41 After all, lifeless natural beauty,
though lifeless, is beautiful nonetheless.
C. Case for Preserving a Lifeless Body
Recognizing the inherent value of an environment is not a foreign
concept in international environmental law. For example, the interna-
tional community has treated Antarctica as a unique region of the Earth
that, although mineral-rich, is worth some level of protection.42 The in-
ternational community has also recognized the intrinsic value of certain
species, proscribing their trade and overharvesting.43 There is a similar
39 WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 25; see also Roberts, supra note 15, at 130 (noting that
helium-3 on the Moon has “ ‘10 times [the energy potential] contained in all the known
economically recoverable fossil fuels on Earth’ ” (quoting RICHARD S. LEWIS, SPACE IN THE
21ST CENTURY 143 (1990))); Hatch, supra note 5, at 230–37.
40 See WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 25.
41 See Roberts, supra note 15, at 146–47 (calling for a “moderate biosphere-centric position”
on space environmentalism that “rejects the notion that humanity and its activity are the
sole items of value” and that “acknowledges that . . . the environment as a whole ha[s] value
in [its] own right in addition to [its] value for human purposes”); see also Charles S. Cockell
& Gerda Horneck, Planetary Parks—Formulating a Wilderness Policy for Planetary Bodies,
22 SPACE POL’Y 256, 257–58 (2006) (arguing that there are twenty-two separate arguments
for the preservation of lifeless areas on a planet, including: (1) the necessity of land preser-
vation to a fully formed concept of “space civilization,” setting humans apart from mere
animals responding to their environmental conditions; (2) the intrinsic value of an area
“independent of human valuation”; (3) expression of “respect for the options and choices
of future people”; and (4) the unknown and indirect benefits a lifeless area may provide).
42 See Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty art. 7, opened for sig-
nature Oct. 4, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1455 (entered into force Jan. 14, 1998) [hereinafter Madrid
Protocol] (“Any activity relating to mineral resources [in Antarctica], other than scientific
research, shall be prohibited.”). Indeed, “the Antarctic Treaty is closely linked to and served
as a model for the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.” Paul B. Larsen, Application of the Precaution-
ary Principle to the Moon, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 295, 297 (2006).
43 See Roberts, supra note 15, at 148 (citing The Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for signature Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T.
1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 1, 1975) [hereinafter CITES Convention]);
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argument to be made for the preservation of the Moon. Although it pos-
sesses abundant resources, the Moon has value independent of its eco-
nomic potential, much as the value of Antarctica is recognized independent
of its mineral wealth. Indeed, existing space treaties already recognize
the Moon’s intrinsic value, albeit ambiguously.44
Ultimately, a balanced approach to the preservation of the Moon—
one that promotes some degree of exploitation while protecting significant
features, including our own history there—is necessary.45 An approach
similar to that of the World Heritage Convention is therefore ideal, as it
protects those areas with scientific and cultural significance to humanity,
and those with natural importance to the Moon as a body, while opening
the rest of the surface to human utilization and settlement. Looking
farther into our solar system, Mars, with its potential for life, offers other
justifications for preservation.
II. HERITAGE ON MARS: PRESERVING LIFE AND ITS POTENTIAL
Unlike the Moon, which has not and likely will not support life be-
yond the earthly beings who settle there, Mars likely has supported, does
support, or could support extraterrestrial life.46 The rare ability of Mars to
harbor at least the precursors of life presents new arguments—both ethical
and scientific—for its preservation.47 Specifically, if Mars is capable of
see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 119(1)(a), opened for sig-
nature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) (requiring fishing
States to maintain and restore populations based not only on economic factors, but also
on the prosperity of the species themselves in the name of biodiversity); CITES Con-
vention, supra, at pmbl. (“Recognizing that wild flora and fauna in their many beautiful
and varied forms are an irreplaceable part of the natural systems of the earth which
must be protected for this and the generations to come.”).
44 See infra Part IV. In fact, our environmental impact on the Moon has been part of the
discussion since NASA’s first missions there. See NEIL M. MAHER, APOLLO IN THE AGE OF
AQUARIUS 104–05 (2017) (describing newspaper articles after the first Apollo landing
lamenting the trash astronauts left behind, with one writer quirking that “[the astro-
nauts] should take an empty beer can with them, ‘just for symbolism’s sake.’ ” (quoting Rose
DeWolf, Astronauts Are Neat in Their Cabin, But Will Be Litter Bugs on the Moon, EVENING
BULL., July 17, 1969, at 1)).
45 See Roberts, supra note 15, at 148–57 (discussing the property and liability regimes for
inhospitable environments like the Moon); see also Hatch, supra note 5, at 286–87 (de-
scribing the two extremes on the lunar resource management spectrum: unbridled
exploitation, or an all-out ban on non-scientific resource extraction).
46 See Carl Zimmer, Life on Mars?, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 2005), https://www.smithsoni
anmag.com/science-nature/life-on-mars-78138144/ [https://perma.cc/B8MC-FR4M].
47 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 15, at 157–60 (arguing for more precaution in the exploi-
tation of galactic environments with the potential to harbor life until more information
about the existence of life in those environments is discovered).
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hosting life—either in the past, today, or in the near future—the interest
in protecting that life or its potential would justify greater protection of
large swaths of the Martian surface.48 This Part considers the biological
and natural importance of Mars and the corresponding need to preserve
at least parts of it.
A. Biological Heritage on Mars
In 2015, scientists discovered “salty streaks” that suggested the
existence of saltwater on Mars and “raise[d] the tantalising prospect of a
viable habitat for microbial life” on the planet.49 This was not the first dis-
covery of water on Mars, either.50 In 1970, the Mariner 9 rover discovered
Martian river channels carved by liquid water billions of years before.51
In 2000, images from the Mars Orbiter Camera showed deep grooves on
the inside slopes of craters, which scientists believed were formed by
water escaping the Martian crust.52 Evidence shows that some of these
grooves change each year, indicating that water still flows into them,
though alternate explanations exist.53 In 2008, the Phoenix lander dis-
covered water-ice below the Martian surface, and droplets of liquid water
formed on the lander’s legs.54 And, in 2011, the Mars Reconnaissance
Orbiter transmitted images of “dark downhill streaks that come and go
with the seasons,” which NASA believes show water “seeping from the
ground and wetting the surface enough to darken it.”55 Spectrometric
analysis of the streaks showed that they contained salts that could allow
water to flow in liquid form, even at Mars’s subfreezing temperatures.56
The existence of water on Mars suggests that Earth is not the only
planet in our solar system to host life, though further research is neces-
sary.57 One possibility is the existence of extremophile organisms, which are
48 Id. at 159–60.
49 David Rothery, NASA: streaks of salt on Mars mean flowing water, and raise new hopes
of finding life, THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 28, 2015), https://theconversation.com/nasa
-streaks-of-salt-on-mars-mean-flowing-water-and-raise-new-hopes-of-finding-life-48182
[https://perma.cc/VYE2-LDWM].
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See id. (explaining that some of the “gullies” could have resulted from avalanches or
“slabs of frozen carbon dioxide scooting downhill”).
54 Id.
55 Rothery, supra note 49.
56 Id.
57 Rodrigo Ledesma-Aguillar, Mars: contamination, planetary protection and the search for
life, THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 30, 2015), https://theconversation.com/mars-contamination
-planetary-protection-and-the-search-for-life-48363 [https://perma.cc/CV3V-HW2G].
2019] GALACTIC PRESERVATION AND BEYOND 849
hardy enough to withstand the Martian environment, or of “ ‘proto’ life
forms—organisms similar to viruses, enzymes and prions—similar to
those that may have existed on Earth before bacteria.”58 Indeed, meteorites
from Mars may have brought the beginnings of life to our planet, meaning
“Martian landscapes could preserve a record of the emergence of life” in our
solar system.59 In any case, the potential for life and need for further re-
search has already raised calls for preservation of those regions of Mars
most favorable to biological development.60
Without preservation of sensitive and potentially life-harboring
areas, human exploration threatens to introduce “microscopic stowaways”
that survive on Mars and contaminate the unique Martian environment.61
In fact, manmade objects already on Mars could well have carried microbes
from Earth.62 Any life that might exist on Mars likely is fragile, so the risk
that objects from Earth could eliminate Martian life, or its precursors, war-
rants greater protections for potentially life-harboring areas of the Red
Planet.63 And, although some have pushed for the eventual “terraforming”
of Mars,64 preservation of its surface for the time being will be necessary to
discover more about Martian life and its significance to our story. Moving
forward, spacefaring nations must balance humanity’s need for interplan-
etary existence with the duty to respect potential life on another planet.65
58 Id.
59 Michael P. Oman-Reagan, Interplanetary Environmentalism, SAPIENS (June 23, 2016),
https://www.sapiens.org/column/wanderers/terraform-mars-anthropocene/ [https://perma
.cc/9GDL-PUWS].
60 See Ledesma-Aguillar, supra note 57 (noting that the United States National Academy
of Sciences and the European Space Sciences Committee “have already produced a report
foreseeing . . . ‘special regions’ of interest apart from sources of briny water, including
methane-rich areas, shallow ice-rich deposits and subsurface cavities such as caves”).
61 Id. See generally Jeb Butler, Note, Unearthly Microbes and the Laws Designed to Resist
Them, 41 GA. L. REV. 1355 (2007) (arguing for an international treaty to prevent inter-
planetary microbial contamination).
62 See Ledesma-Aguillar, supra note 57 (noting that the Opportunity and Curiosity rovers
already on Mars could “be deemed unfit to travel to biologically promising areas due to
the hazard of microbial contamination from Earth”).
63 Id.
64 See id. (discussing plans for some space exploration companies to eventually terraform
Mars to have a climate and landscape more similar to Earth’s).
65 Id. For a discussion on the ethical debate surrounding human influence on Mars, see
Paul York, The Ethics of Terraforming, PHILOSOPHY NOW (2002), https://philosophynow
.org/issues/38/The_Ethics_of_Terraforming [https://perma.cc/K32L-DYQ7] (arguing that
terraforming of Mars is ethically dubious, even if Mars is lifeless). In 2003, concerns for
life on one of Jupiter’s moons, Europa, caused NASA to destroy its nuclear orbiter,
Galileo, instead of crashing it into the moon. See Sergio Marchisio, Protecting the Space
Environment, 46 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 9, 14 (2003).
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B. Natural Heritage on Mars
Like Earth and the Moon, Mars is home to geologic and topographic
features that give it its unique identity. Recognizing those features that
make Mars unique should also be a priority in future regulation of Mar-
tian exploitation.
The landscape of Mars is largely shaped by weathering from myriad
forces, including volcanism, wind, glaciation, tectonic movements, ancient
floods, and impact craters.66 At its highest points, Mars is home to enor-
mous mountains, including the largest volcanic mountain in our solar
system, Olympus Mons, and mountains in the Tharsis region “that are
so huge they deform the planet’s roundness.”67 In fact, unlike the tectonic
mechanisms on Earth, which move horizontally as plates crash into and
move apart from one another, Martian tectonics work vertically, thrust-
ing magma upwards and creating its volcanic giants.68 Elsewhere, wind
has formed other topographic features, including the Murray Buttes near
Mount Sharp that provide both a record of Mars’s geologic and climatologic
history and breath-taking views that have been likened to national parks
in the United States.69 At its lowest, the Martian landscape cascades into
a giant equatorial rift valley, Valles Marineris, which extends the distance
of the continental United States and is deep enough in parts to fit the
entire Grand Canyon, and then some.70
Mars also possesses features unfamiliar to our planet. For exam-
ple, the entire planet is, at times, covered in dust storms, creating dunes,
streaks, and other landscapes.71 At its poles, Martian ice caps form from
both water—as on Earth—and carbon dioxide, the latter of which is re-
leased as gas during the Martian spring and summer.72 The process of
sublimation—the transition of frozen carbon dioxide and water directly
into gas without a liquid intermediary stage—is responsible for linear gul-
lies, features not seen on Earth, formed after glaciers carve pits in the
66 Mars, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/space/solar-system
/mars/ [https://perma.cc/T2WQ-9XL8] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Mars].
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Hanneke Weitering, Red Planet Hike: Mars Looks Like National Park in Awesome New
Pics, SPACE.COM (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.space.com/34037-awesome-mars-landscape
-photos-national-parks.html [https://perma.cc/77YN-NC7D].
70 Mars, supra note 66.
71 Id.
72 Winters on Mars are shaping the Red Planet’s landscape, SCIENCEDAILY (Oct. 27, 2017),
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/10/171027085533.htm [https://perma.cc
/Z6AE-CGQ4].
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Martian landscape and then dissipate, leaving no debris apron because
there is no liquid.73
Familiar or otherwise, Mars is home to astonishing features that
provide it with an individual identity. Although there is potential that
the Red Planet may one day be terraformed into an Earth-like home for
our species, such plans are a distant dream from the closer realization of
Martian mining and human settlement. With exploitation on the horizon,
the potential for life and the unique landscapes of Mars call for protect-
ing our planetary neighbor’s natural and biological majesty before it is
too late. As it stands, international law falls far short of this goal.
III. CULTURAL AND NATURAL PRESERVATION IN INTERNATIONAL
SPACE LAW
A. Existing Protections
Although space law is a relatively modern arm of public interna-
tional law, its framework treaties have remained stagnant since the
1970s.74 Currently, there are five main treaties governing outer space,
namely: (1) the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (“Outer Space Treaty” or “OST”);75 (2) the 1968 Agreement
on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of
Objects Launched into Outer Space (“Astronaut Agreement”);76 (3) the Con-
vention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (“Reg-
istration Convention”);77 (4) the 1972 Convention on International Liability
for Damage Caused by Space Objects (“Liability Convention”);78 and (5) the
1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (“Moon Treaty”).79 Of these five, the Astronaut Agreement
and Registration Convention offer nothing substantive as far as galactic
73 See id.
74 See Apking, supra note 15, at 448.
75 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12.
76 Opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (entered into force
Dec. 3, 1968).
77 Opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 (entered into force
Sept. 15, 1976).
78 Opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force
Sept. 1, 1972).
79 Opened for signature Dec. 5, 1979, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force
July 11, 1984) [hereinafter Moon Treaty]; Apking, supra note 15, at 448.
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environmentalism.80 And the Liability Convention, although providing
a fault scheme for damage caused by spacecraft, does not consider liability
for environmental damage on celestial bodies.81 The Outer Space Treaty
and Moon Treaty are, therefore, the primary sources of international en-
vironmental law in space.82
1. Outer Space Treaty
The Outer Space Treaty was the first of the five space treaties
spearheaded by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, and entered into force in 1967.83 The OST’s original goal was
to prevent the United States or Soviet Union from expanding military oper-
ations into space, though the Treaty remains in effect today.84 As of March
2018, the Treaty had 105 States Parties, including all spacefaring nations.85
Substantively, only one provision of the OST, Article IX, provides
any explicit obligation to protect celestial environments. Specifically,
Article IX requires that States Parties avoid “harmful contamination” of
celestial bodies when pursuing “studies” and that they notify the interna-
tional community when they “ha[ve] reason to believe that an activity or
experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space . . . would cause
potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in
the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.”86
Although they do not provide explicit environmental obligations,
other provisions of the OST support environmentalism in space and respect
for celestial environments. Article I, for instance, provides that “[t]he explo-
ration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,”87
80 See Apking, supra note 15, at 448.
81 See id. at 449.
82 See id. at 446–47, 449–50.
83 Myers, supra note 11, at 91; see also Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork
/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html [https://perma.cc/N9AF-2NDM] (last visited
Apr. 3, 2019).
84 Ellis, supra note 15, at 523; see also Myers, supra note 11, at 94; Hatch, supra note 5,
at 243–44.
85 See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.N. OFFICE FOR DIS-
ARMAMENT AFFAIRS, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer_space [https://perma.cc
/FGK8-CBRH] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
86 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12, at art. IX.
87 Id. at art. I.
2019] GALACTIC PRESERVATION AND BEYOND 853
suggesting that a nation cannot use a celestial body in a way that detri-
ments other states’ interests. Article I also holds that space “shall be the
province of all mankind,”88 further affirming some degree of obligation to
use celestial resources in a manner that is not detrimental to the greater
interests of humanity. Finally, the OST requires that there be “freedom
of scientific investigation in . . . space,”89 meaning scientific endeavor is
at least a primary focus of space exploration. As discussed in Section
III.B, however, the OST’s environmental provisions, both explicit and
implicit, fall short of mandating any real environmental protections for
celestial bodies.90
2. The Moon Treaty
In contrast to its predecessor, the OST, the Moon Treaty calls for
more stringent protection of our celestial neighbor.91 First, its scope is
much broader, applying to private exploitation as well as scientific re-
search and exploration.92 Specifically, the Moon Treaty expands upon the
OST by “explicitly stat[ing] that no entity or natural person may appro-
priate property in a celestial body or resource through its use.”93
The Moon Treaty also provides more substantive protections of
the lunar environment. Article 7(1), in particular, calls for States Parties
to “prevent the disruption of the existing balance of [the Moon’s] environ-
ment, whether by introducing adverse changes in that environment, by
its harmful contamination through the introduction of extra-environmen-
tal matter or otherwise.”94 Importantly, the Moon Treaty allows States
Parties to request that the Secretary-General of the United Nations
designate certain “areas of the moon [with] special scientific interest . . .
as international scientific preserves for which special protective arrange-
ments are to be agreed upon in consultation with the component bodies of
the United Nations.”95 Finally, the Treaty requires that States Parties
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See infra Section III.B.
91 See Roberts, supra note 15, at 142.
92 Id.
93 Ellis, supra note 15, at 526–27; see also Moon Treaty, supra note 79, at art. 11(3)
(stating that “[n]either the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof
or natural resources in place,” shall become property of any State or national or inter-
national organization).
94 Moon Treaty, supra note 79, at art. 7(1).
95 Id. at art. 7(3).
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consider the interests of future generations in their space exploration ac-
tivities.96 Collectively, these provisions provide more substantial protections
for the lunar environment than the OST; however, the Moon Treaty still
suffers many shortcomings that have prevented its words from having
much effect.97
B. Shortcomings of Existing Space Law: A Sputnik Treaty System
in a SpaceX Galaxy
Although providing some protections of celestial bodies, the Outer
Space Treaty and Moon Treaty suffer from severe flaws that have ren-
dered them ineffective. Ambiguity and generality have handicapped the
Treaties, and this weakness is only compounded by the failure of countries
to enforce the Treaties. What remains are two treaties with aspirational
ideals, but unworkable standards.98
1. The Outer Space Treaty: Bark Without Bite
The Outer Space Treaty has been criticized both for its inadequate
property regime and its ineffective environmental protections. Notably,
the Outer Space Treaty’s most substantive environmental provision—the
Article IX anti-contamination obligation—has proven to be an inadequate
means of environmental protection, lacking any procedural mechanism
for enforcement.99 Moreover, the OST does not apply to private exploita-
tion,100 a key activity this Article seeks to address. In addition, Article
IX’s requirement that a State Party consult with the international
community when it believes its activities might be harmful to another
nation’s interests naively depends on that State Party’s willingness to
voluntarily disclose information that likely goes against its own well-
being.101 And, even when a State Party does consult others, that consul-
tation lacks the precedential value and normative formality necessary to
have any real bite.102 If political and military considerations are involved,
which is probable in space disputes, consultation is especially unlikely
to be effective.103
96 Id. at art. 4.
97 See infra Section III.B.2.
98 See generally Roberts, supra note 15, at 139–44.
99 See Apking, supra note 15, at 447–48; see also Roberts, supra note 15, at 139.
100 See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12.
101 Apking, supra note 15, at 447; see also Roberts, supra note 15, at 139.
102 See Roberts, supra note 15, at 140; see also Apking, supra note 15, at 447.
103 See Roberts, supra note 15, at 140 (citing the protracted discussions in the dispute over
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The OST also suffers from ambiguity. In particular, Article IX’s
“harmful contamination” and “harmful interference” terms are not de-
fined in the Treaty, and there is little indication of what they might
mean elsewhere in the OST.104 It is also unclear whether the obligation
to do no harm is an obligation not to harm human interests in space, or
an obligation to the celestial bodies themselves.105 Finally, internal con-
flicts between Article IX and other OST provisions that essentially create
a galactic commons threaten to undermine any environmental protec-
tions the OST does provide once resource extraction becomes economi-
cal.106 If “harmful contamination” is ambiguous and unenforceable, the
perverse incentive of the commons is likely to override any obligation
under Article IX, especially for private actors considered outside the
Treaty’s scope.
Ultimately, the OST’s biggest strength is its wide acceptance by
the international community, including all spacefaring nations.107 But
the Treaty lacks any substantive obligations, and those obligations that
it does contain are ineffectively enforced or simply ignored.108 As private
and state actors begin to explore and extract galactic resources, it is only
a matter of time before the OST becomes a relic of the Sputnik era.
2. The Moon Treaty: A Rejected Framework
Although the Moon Treaty has more concrete and robust require-
ments than the Outer Space Treaty, like its predecessor, it fails to offer a
the damage caused by the loss of the Soviet nuclear-powered spacecraft Cosmos 954 as
an example of consultation’s inefficiencies).
104 See id. at 139; see also Hatch, supra note 5, at 246 (hypothesizing that the OST was
intentionally written ambiguously so the two Cold War superpowers would agree to sign).
105 See Roberts, supra note 15, at 139.
106 See id. at 141; see also Hatch, supra note 5, at 260 (predicting “the failure of the OST
regime once the Moon becomes a resource base that is readily accessible”).
107 Roberts, supra note 15, at 140 (noting that the legitimacy of the OST appears to be the
only “significant restraint upon the activity of the States Parties and their citizenry”).
108 For example, some have argued that the 1998 Space Station Agreement ignored the OST’s
provisions prohibiting extensions of sovereignty to space. See Ellis, supra note 15, at 539–40
(citing Mary B. McCord, Responding to the Space Station Agreement: The Extension of U.S.
Law into Space, 77 GEO. L.J. 1933, 1939–42 (1988)). But see Rochus Moenter, The Interna-
tional Space Station: Legal Framework and Current Status, 64 J. AIR L. & COM. 1033, 1042,
1044, 1046 (1998) (arguing that the Space Station Agreement fits within the OST because
Article VIII of the treaty permits extensions of national jurisdiction to spacecraft like the
International Space Station).
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new sovereignty or property ownership regime that overrides the galactic
commons problem.109 In addition, the Moon Treaty’s requirement that
States Parties take measures to avoid introducing adverse changes does
not define “adverse changes,” creating the same ambiguity problem as in
the OST.110 There is also the interesting question of whether the Moon
Treaty permits changes that are adverse to the lunar environment, but
not adverse to humans.111
In any case, the Moon Treaty has proven ineffective not because of
any one provision, but because the international community has resoundly
rejected it.112 As of March 2018, the Treaty had only eighteen States Par-
ties, and no spacefaring nation had yet to ratify it.113 Thus, even if the Moon
Treaty provides some measure of environmental protection in space, its
obligations are inapplicable to those most likely to send craft and crews
beyond Earth’s orbit.
IV. PROTECTION OF CULTURAL AND NATURAL HERITAGE ON EARTH
Although international environmental law has failed to lift off into
space, earthbound protection of the environment—at least as far as preser-
vation of important sites—has been more robust and successful. As this
Part will discuss, the World Heritage Convention and the Convention for
the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage both provide a framework
upon which the international community can construct a future galactic
preservation treaty. Section IV.A will describe these international agree-
ments in succession, while Section IV.B will consider the barriers to their
expansion into space.
109 Roberts, supra note 15, at 143; see also Hatch, supra note 5, at 251.
110 See Roberts, supra note 15, at 143–44 (“As in the Outer Space Treaty, the familiar
‘harmful contamination,’ and the newer terminology of ‘adverse changes,’ remain unde-
fined [in the Moon Treaty].”).
111 See id. at 144 (arguing that the later language in the provision suggests a human-
centric perspective on what constitutes “adverse changes”).
112 Id.
113 See Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
U.N. OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/moon [https://
perma.cc/6RRJ-L783] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019) (showing that Armenia, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Chile, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan,
Peru, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela are the only parties
to have ascended to or ratified the treaty). Notably, China, India, Japan, the European
Union, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom are not parties to the treaty.
See id.
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A. International Protection of Cultural and Natural Heritage on
Earth
1. World Heritage Convention
The General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Sci-
entific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) adopted the Convention
Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage (the
“World Heritage Convention” or “WHC”) on November 16, 1972.114 The
idea for the WHC stemmed from the international response to the threat-
ened destruction of the Abu Simbel and Philae temples following con-
struction of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt.115 The success of that project
snowballed into other successful efforts to preserve the Venetian Lagoon,
the ruins at Moenjodaro, Pakistan, and the Borobodur Temple in Indone-
sia, eventually leading to the adoption of the WHC.116 As of March 2018,
the WHC had 193 States Parties.117
Substantively, the WHC obliges States Parties to identify, protect,
conserve, present, and transmit to future generations cultural and natural
heritage sites within their territories.118 “Cultural heritage” is defined by
the Convention to include monuments and groups of buildings of “out-
standing universal value from the point of view of history, art or science,”
as well as sites of universal value “from the historical, aesthetic, ethno-
logical or anthropological point of view.”119 Sites of “natural heritage” are
separately defined to include natural features, geological and physio-
graphical formations, and sites of universal value to science, conservation,
or natural beauty.120 Article 11 requires each State Party to submit a list
114 The World Heritage Convention, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/convention/ [https://
perma.cc/637B-FU4X] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019) [hereinafter The World Heritage Con-
vention].
115 Id. (noting that fifty nations raised nearly half of the $80 million cost of disassembling
and moving the temples). Although not culminating in a treaty until the 1970s, interna-
tional cooperation for the preservation of cultural heritage dates back to the League of
Nations’ International Museum Office and the 1931 Athens Charter for the Restoration
of Historic Monuments. See CHRISTINA CAMERON & MECHTILD RÖSSLER, MANY VOICES, ONE
VISION: THE EARLY YEARS OF THE WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION ch. 1 (2013) (ebook).
116 The World Heritage Convention, supra note 114.
117 See States Parties Ratification Status, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/
[https://perma.cc/RC4H-SEHG] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
118 The World Heritage Convention: Complete Text, UNESCO arts. 3–4, http://whc.unesco
.org/en/conventiontext/ [https://perma.cc/9G92-V63N] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019) [hereinafter
The World Heritage Convention: Complete Text].
119 Id. at art. 1.
120 Id. at art. 2.
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of all sites within its territorial jurisdiction that meet these criteria.121
The Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the Cultural and
Natural Heritage of Outstanding Universal Value (the “World Heritage
Committee” or “Committee”) may then determine which sites submitted
by each State Party are to be listed on the World Heritage List.122 Addi-
tionally, the World Heritage Committee may name sites “the conserva-
tion of which major operations are necessary and for which assistance
has been requested under [the] Convention” to the “List of World Heritage
in Danger.”123 The Committee may also determine more specific criteria
for inclusion on either the World Heritage List or List of World Heritage
in Danger.124
Once a site is added to either the World Heritage List or the List
of World Heritage in Danger, Article 6 obliges all States Parties to pro-
tect the site and to not “take any deliberate measures which might damage
directly or indirectly” sites of cultural or natural heritage within another
State Party.125 Article 7 further provides a general obligation of all States
Parties to cooperate with and assist in efforts to conserve and identify
cultural and natural heritage.126 Finally, the last three articles establish
the World Heritage Fund, comprised of governmental and private contri-
butions, which the Committee can use to assist States Parties in “the
protection, conservation, presentation or rehabilitation of ” sites on either
of the heritage lists.127
2. 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Underwater
Cultural Heritage
In 2001, the international community recognized that the World
Heritage Convention and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea both failed to adequately protect cultural heritage at sea, especially
heritage located beyond the jurisdiction of any nation, and developed the
121 Id. at art. 11(1). The World Heritage Committee comprises twenty-one States Parties
elected by the General Assembly of UNESCO, with advisory roles for various intergov-
ernmental and non-governmental organizations. See id. at arts. 8–10.
122 Id. at art. 11(2).
123 The World Heritage Convention: Complete Text, supra note 118, at art. 11(4).
124 Id. at art. 11(5).
125 Id. at art. 6.
126 Id. at art. 7.
127 Id. at arts. 13–16. Each State Party is obligated to pay into the Fund in an amount not
to exceed one percent of their contribution to the general UNESCO budget. Id. at art. 16.
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Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage (“Underwa-
ter Heritage Convention” or “UHC”) in response.128 The UHC has fifty-eight
parties as of March 2018.129
The Underwater Heritage Convention defines “underwater cul-
tural heritage” as “all traces of human existence having a cultural, histori-
cal or archaeological character which have been partially or totally under
water, periodically or continuously, for at least 100 years such as . . .
structures, buildings, artefacts and human remains . . . vessels, aircraft . . .
and objects of prehistoric character.”130 This definition excludes natural
heritage, something the World Heritage Convention recognizes,131 and
also draws an arbitrary age threshold of 100 years.132 The Convention
prefers in situ preservation to extraction, and requires salvage opera-
tions to be “authorized by the competent authorities.”133
Importantly, the UHC obligates a State Party and any party under
its jurisdiction to avoid direct or indirect damage to protected sites.134 It
further encourages international cooperation, including bilateral and
multilateral treaties, to preserve and protect underwater heritage sites.135 
Like other conventions dealing with actions at sea, the UHC alters
the obligations and rights of States Parties depending on the location of
the heritage site.136 Importantly for this Article, the UHC includes obliga-
tions to protect underwater heritage beyond the jurisdiction of any State,
in a region the Convention calls the “Area.”137 Specifically, the Convention
requires vessels flying the flag of a State Party to report the discovery of
any site in the Area that would qualify as underwater cultural heritage.138
128 See Vadi, supra note 26, at 361–62.
129 See Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage, UNESCO, http://
www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13520&language=E&order=alpha [https://
perma.cc/2U93-T2UB] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
130 Underwater Heritage Convention, supra note 13, at art. 1(1)(a).
131 World Heritage Convention, supra note 13, at art. 2.
132 See Valentina Vadi, Underwater Cultural Heritage and the Market: The Uncertain Des-
tiny of Historic Sunken Warships Under International Law, in ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE
AND THE MARKET: ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 241 (Valentina Vadi et al. eds., 2014) (“The
100-year cut-off point ‘has no logic from a scientific viewpoint but [was] inserted purely for
administrative reasons.’”) (quoting Patrick O’Keefe, Protection and international collabora-
tion: the legal framework of the UNESCO convention 2001, in FINISHING THE INTERRUPTED
VOYAGE 91 (Lyndel Prott ed., 2006)).
133 Underwater Heritage Convention, supra note 13, at arts. 2(5), 2(7), 4, 33.
134 Id. at art. 5.
135 Id. at art. 6.
136 See id. at arts. 8–12.
137 Id. at arts. 11–12.
138 Id. at art. 11(1).
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Any State Party may then declare “its interest in being consulted on how
to ensure the effective protection of that underwater cultural heritage.”139
The UHC calls for the appointment of a “Coordinating State” for each site
charged with organizing the consultation of all interested parties and im-
plementing any agreed-upon protective measures.140 The Coordinating
State may also grant or deny authorization for future activities at the
site.141 The UHC requires Coordinating States to act “for the benefit of hu-
manity as a whole, on behalf of all States Parties” and with “[p]articular
regard . . . to the preferential rights of States of cultural, historical or ar-
chaeological origin.”142 States that violate the Convention face sanctions
sufficient to deter future violations, which are enforced by the States Part-
ies.143 Like the WHC, the UHC also calls for States Parties to cooperate
in “the protection and management of underwater cultural heritage.”144
B. Expansion of World and Underwater Heritage into Space:
Barriers to Liftoff
As written, the World Heritage and Underwater Heritage Conven-
tions cannot be expanded to include cultural and natural heritage in
space for distinct reasons. First, the Underwater Heritage Convention is
written to address only those sites “partially or totally underwater.”145
Thus, even though the UHC contemplates preservation of sites beyond
the jurisdiction of any state, those sites must be below the Earth’s
oceans, not in space. The WHC is limited for a different, though related,
reason: it requires a site to be within the territory of a State Party.146
Galactic heritage sites would therefore also be beyond the scope of the
139 Underwater Heritage Convention, supra note 13, at art. 11(4).
140 Id. at arts. 12(2), 12(4).
141 Id. at art. 12(4)(b).
142 Id. at art. 12(6).
143 See id. at art. 17.
144 Id. at art. 19(1).
145 Underwater Heritage Convention, supra note 13, at art. 1(1)(a).
146 See supra notes 119–26 and accompanying text; see also Vadi, supra note 26, at 95
(“[W]orld heritage sites, unlike the ‘common heritage of mankind,’ remain subject to the
territorial sovereignty of the territorial state, and property rights are left untouched by
the World Heritage Convention.”); Ellis, supra note 15, at 551 (noting that the Underwater
Heritage Treaty demonstrates the intention that the World Heritage program not extend
to areas outside the territory of a State Party). The World Heritage Committee has not
shown any interest in outer space preservation, either. See Cecilia Ballí, We made history
on the moon. But how do we preserve it?, HOUS. CHRON. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.hous
tonchronicle.com/local/gray-matters/article/Moon-Preservation-11402877.php [https://perma
.cc/4F6U-RWTC].
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WHC, because, under the Outer Space Treaty, no state may declare sov-
ereignty or jurisdiction over a celestial body.147 Moreover, the WHC obliges
States Parties to take charge of maintaining the sites within their territo-
ries, which the OST’s no-sovereignty rule renders impracticable.148
Realistically, neither the World Heritage nor Underwater Heritage
Conventions can be easily extended beyond Earth’s orbit to include galactic
sites worthy of protection and preservation. That said, the Conventions
do provide an ideal framework for a similar treaty, the Galactic Heritage
Convention, proposed in the next Part.
V. A NEW APPROACH: THE GALACTIC HERITAGE CONVENTION
Although limited in scope, the World Heritage and Underwater
Heritage Conventions demonstrate the international community’s ability
to develop a preservation regime for important cultural and natural sites.
These Conventions provide an easily translatable framework for similar
preservation of important sites in our galaxy. This Part will discuss how
aspects of the WHC and UHC can be combined to create a new Galactic
Heritage Convention (“GHC”) that will protect sites of cultural impor-
tance (for example, the Apollo landing sites), natural importance (for ex-
ample, Olympus Mons on Mars), and scientific importance (for example,
the regions of Mars most likely to host evidence of life). After establishing
this framework, Section V.B will then discuss the benefits of using the
heritage approach to preserve celestial bodies.
A. The Framework: Protecting Cultural and Natural Heritage in
Space
Ideally, the Galactic Heritage Convention would include aspects
from both the World Heritage Convention and its underwater counter-
part. Specifically, the GHC would adopt the WHC’s inclusion of natural
as well as cultural sites, so that it could be used to preserve sites of na-
tural and biological importance as well as those considered important to
human history. The GHC would then mirror the Underwater Heritage
Convention in its approach to recognizing sites, developing measures for
their protection, and enforcing those measures.
147 See Ellis, supra note 15, at 551; Ballí, supra note 146 (describing the difficulties of
designating the Apollo landing sites as National Historic Landmarks under U.S. law, noting
that “[the OST] prohibits any country from appropriating outer space”).
148 Ellis, supra note 15, at 551.
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The GHC would include provisions for the protection of three main
types of sites: (1) cultural heritage sites; (2) natural heritage sites; and
(3) scientific sites. As with the WHC, the GHC would allow its governing
committee to promulgate more in-depth criteria for inclusion on the List
of Galactic Heritage Sites (the “List”).149 Cultural heritage would be de-
fined to include sites of universal value due to their significance to the
history of human space exploration. Most notably, the definition would
be used to protect the sites of the Apollo 11 and Apollo 17 landings and
the sites of any future manned landings on Mars.150 Unmanned landing
sites, such as those of the Soviet Union’s Luna missions, might also be
protected from disturbances.
The natural heritage category, unlike cultural heritage, would be
used to protect areas of a celestial body that are part of that body’s identity
and natural beauty, regardless of their subjective importance to humanity.
Like the WHC’s natural heritage category, the GHC would protect areas
for their aesthetic value as well.151 This category could be used to protect
certain Maria on the Moon or the highest peaks and most breath-taking
valleys on Mars.152
Finally, although the WHC includes scientific importance as part
of its definition of natural heritage,153 the GHC would establish scientifi-
cally valuable sites as a separate category to recognize that the Moon and
Mars host manmade devices and naturally insignificant regions that are
nonetheless hugely important for ongoing and future scientific research.
Crucially, this category would protect the seismological and laser equip-
ment at certain Apollo and Lunar sites on the Moon, as well as regions
of Mars thought to host evidence of life.
To identify sites within the three categories and to develop mea-
sures for their protection, the GHC would adopt an approach somewhere
149 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
150 For a history of missions to Mars as of this writing, see Augmented Reality: Explore
InSight, NASA’s Latest Mission to Mars, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes
.com/interactive/2018/05/01/science/mars-nasa-insight-ar-3d-ul.html [https://perma.cc
/FR8P-BHYG].
151 See World Heritage Convention, supra note 13, at art. 2 (protecting sites because of
their “universal value from the aesthetic . . . point of view”).
152 See INT’L ACAD. ASTRONAUTICS, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT OF CELESTIAL BODIES:
THE NEED FOR POLICY AND GUIDELINES 45–48 (Mahulena Hofmann et al., eds., Dec. 2010)
(describing sites on the Moon and Mars that might be worthy of protection for their sci-
entific, historic, natural, or future importance).
153 See id.
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between the World Heritage and Underwater Heritage Conventions. Like
the WHC, the GHC would create a governing committee that would be in
charge of determining which sites make it onto the List of Galactic Heri-
tage Sites or List of Galactic Heritage in Danger.154 States Parties would
elect the Galactic Heritage Committee in a similar manner to the current
World Heritage Committee.155 Because no State Party would have sover-
eignty over any site in space, except maybe the spacecraft themselves,156
the GHC would diverge from the WHC in the manner of recommending
and protecting sites. Similar to the UHC, the Galactic Heritage Conven-
tion would allow any State Party, or flagship of a State Party, to recom-
mend a site for protection to the Galactic Heritage Committee.157 In addi-
tion, the GHC might also permit a special body of scientists to recom-
mend scientifically important areas on celestial bodies. The Galactic
Heritage Committee would then decide within a specified time frame
whether the recommended site makes it onto the List. Depending on
whether the site is listed for its cultural, natural, or scientific importance,
the development and enforcement of protective measures would differ.
For sites listed for their cultural importance, the Galactic Heri-
tage Committee would notify States Parties of the intention of the Com-
mittee to add the site to the List. As under the UHC, States Parties with
an interest in the preservation of the galactic cultural site could notify
the Committee of their desire to be consulted and the Committee would
appoint a Coordinating State and subcommittee of other interested states
charged with developing protective measures for the site in question.158
As a default rule, the GHC would require the Committee to appoint the
State Party of mission origin as the Coordinating State, unless it is in the
interest of all parties to appoint another state.159 For example, the United
States would be given primary rights to develop protective measures for
the Apollo landing sites that make it on the List. The Coordinating State
and its subcommittee would develop protective measures within a specified
154 See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
155 The World Heritage Convention: Complete Text, supra note 118, at art. 9.
156 See Ellis, supra note 15, at 546.
157 Underwater Heritage Convention, supra note 13, at art. 11(4).
158 Id. at art. 12(2).
159 Preferring the interests of the State of mission origin corresponds with the unique
characteristics of a cultural heritage site, the manmade aspects of which are already
owned by the State of origin, while the surface beneath is considered “res publica.” See Vadi,
supra note 26, at 95–96 (discussing the difference between cultural heritage and common
heritage).
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timeframe and publish them. These measures might include restrictions
on how close other crafts can get to the site, as well as limits on the land-
ing trajectories of crafts that might fly over the sites.160 Like the UHC,
primary responsibility for enforcing protective measures would fall on the
Coordinating State, with all States Parties and their nationals obliged
under the Convention to avoid actions directed at a protected site.161 The
Coordinating State would also have the right to authorize or deny any
requests to interfere with the cultural site or sites in its charge, though
it would be required to act in the interest of all humanity when exercising
this discretion.162 Finally, the GHC would mirror the UHC’s encouragement
of bilateral and multilateral agreements between nations, especially agree-
ments between those nations most likely to interact with protected areas.163
For sites of natural or scientific importance, the protective measures
would take into account the interests of humanity and the celestial bodies
themselves, with no one State getting preference. Instead, the Galactic
Heritage Committee would delineate the protective requirements for a site
that all States Parties would then have to follow. As a guide, regulators
might look to the Antarctic Treaty System and its environmental protec-
tion measures.164 To add predictability, the treaty might also limit the
scope of the measures the Committee could adopt.165 Additionally, the
Convention could require that a recognized body of scientists and represen-
tatives from space agencies and private companies be given a role in de-
termining the necessary and proper measures to be adopted. This would
160 For regulations NASA has already proposed, see generally NASA PRESERVATION
REPORT, supra note 20.
161 Underwater Heritage Convention, supra note 13, at art. 12(4)(a).
162 The obligation to act in the interest of all humanity is necessary to prevent discriminatory
use of the Coordinating State’s discretion, such as permitting its own nationals to exploit
a site. In essence, the Coordinating State would act as an agent of the Galactic Heritage
Committee. This is the same obligation found in the UHC. See supra note 143 and ac-
companying text. It is also in keeping with the OST’s requirement that “outer space . . .
shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination . . . on [the] basis
of equality.” Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12, at art. I. A similar permit system has
already been established by Annex V to the Madrid Protocol, which permits the creation of
Specially Protected and Specially Managed Areas in Antarctica. See Madrid Protocol,
supra note 42, at Annex V.
163 Cf. Ellis, supra note 15, at 556 (noting the importance of agreements between those
nations capable of reaching the R.M.S. Titanic to the Titanic’s ultimate protection).
164 See INT’L ACAD. ASTRONAUTICS, supra note 152, at 69–73 (describing the Antarctic
Treaty System as a foundation for outer space preservation).
165 For examples of rules that might be promulgated in galactic heritage sites, see Cockell
& Horneck, supra note 14, at 294 (suggesting that regulators might restrict waste, modes
of access, extent of access, and more within parks).
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give spacefaring nations and companies an extra avenue of input and
buy-in, increasing the likelihood of compliance.166 In any case, the protective
measures would again be enforced by sanctions, reporting requirements,
and normative pressure from the GHC’s hopeful legitimacy.
B. Why This Time Is Different: Benefits of the Heritage Law
Framework
Admittedly, a Galactic Heritage Convention, or any treaty on envi-
ronmental protection in space for that matter, is no small feat. Getting
nations—most importantly, spacefaring nations—to agree to protect en-
tire swaths of lifeless and semi-lifeless bodies will be challenging when
those bodies also present immense opportunities for resource extrac-
tion.167 But if any approach to space environmentalism has the best
chance, the heritage law approach appears to be the most likely to succeed
for several reasons.
First, at least as far as protecting cultural sites, there are long-
standing arguments that cultural wealth is hugely important to a nation.
Adam Smith wrote on the importance of investing in culture as an eco-
nomic driver, and cultural economists have since argued that cultural
heritage and economics are not as distinct as one might imagine.168 In-
deed, the United States has already shown an interest in preserving its
cultural heritage in space by attempting to unilaterally preserve the Apollo
landing sites.169 And the WHC has proven that nations desire to have their
cultural resources “ ‘recognized by UNESCO as important for humanity
and transported through the prestige of the UN system.’”170 It is therefore
166 See INT’L ACAD. ASTRONAUTICS, supra note 152, at 9 (noting that “it would be unwise
to allow a single interest-group, or user-group, to judge which parts of the space environ-
ment should be protected and which should not”).
167 See Ellis, supra note 15, at 551–52 (dismissing the creation of a Galactic Heritage
Treaty because of the effort required).
168 Vadi, supra note 26, at 97–98.
169 See generally NASA PRESERVATION REPORT, supra note 20; Ellis, supra note 15. California
and New Mexico have also added artifacts from the Apollo landings to their historic
registers. Kenneth Chang, To Preserve History on the Moon, Visitors Are Asked to Tread
Lightly, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/science /space/a
-push-for-historic-preservation-on-the-moon.html [https://perma.cc/G2DY-2A7Z]. Russia
has similar interests in its lunar history as well. See Brad Scriber, New Moon Race En-
dangers Historic Space Artifacts, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 2017), https://www.nationalgeo
graphic.com/magazine/2017/08/space-preserving-moon-from-private-industry/ [https://
perma.cc/E2W3-HQQ3].
170 CAMERON & RÖSSLER, supra note 115, at ch. 6 (quoting Interview by Christina Cameron
and Mechtild Rössler with Bernd von Droste, U. Montréal, in Paris, Fr. (Feb. 1, 2008)).
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fair to say that there are inherent incentives for the preservation of galactic
cultural sites that will encourage states, especially spacefaring nations,
to join the GHC out of self-interest. If the GHC is crafted to support, rather
than abrogate, States Parties’ attempts to preserve their own heritage—
as the WHC has done—then its success is even more likely.171
Second, the heritage approach considers the preservation of sites
as an erga omnes obligation of all nations “in the interest of humanity as
a whole.”172 This for-the-benefit-of-all perspective fits within the existing
framework of international space law—one that considers space as belong-
ing to all mankind and not to a particular nation or generation.173 Thus,
by approaching environmentalism in space from the heritage perspective,
international negotiators are already within the same paradigm as exist-
ing space law, making more dramatic changes to the space law treaty
system unnecessary.
Third, the heritage approach allows for the consideration of moral
arguments for preservation.174 This allows the international community to
define the value of a site based on more than its importance as property (of
which there is no concept in space), and to consider arguments for the pres-
ervation of areas on lifeless bodies (such as the Moon) and on potentially
life-harboring bodies (such as Mars) at the same time.175 In other words, the
heritage approach to space environmentalism allows for flexibility and
for a more expansive definition of what can and should be protected.176
The GHC would likely have the same prestige-gaining incentive for states with cultural
heritage in space, though it must maintain some level of selectivity to do so. Cf. id.
171 See Vadi, supra note 26, at 121–22.
172 Id. at 103; see also CAMERON & RÖSSLER, supra note 115, at ch. 6 (describing the World
Heritage Committee’s efforts to preserve the Old City of Dubrovnik in Croatia during the
Balkan Wars in the absence of a viable State Party, and noting that “ ‘[t]he great strength
of the World Heritage is in establishing the idea that a site that has been placed [on] the
List somehow creates a sort of ergo omnis obligation by states’ ” (quoting Interview by
Christina Cameron and Mechtild Rössler with Francesco Francioni, U. Montréal, in Rome,
It. (May 5, 2010))); Corrine Brenner, Note, Cultural Property Law: Reflecting on the Bamiyan
Buddhas’ Destruction, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 237, 261–68 (discussing whether de-
struction of a heritage site would violate erga omnes or jus cogens obligations).
173 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12, at art. I; see also Vadi, supra note 26, at 104
(noting that “ ‘[h]eritage creates a perception of something handed down; something to be
cared for and cherished’ ” (quoting Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick J. O’Keefe, ‘Cultural Heritage’
or ‘Cultural Property’?, 1 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 307, 311 (1992))).
174 Vadi, supra note 26, at 105.
175 See id.
176 See CAMERON & RÖSSLER, supra note 115, at ch. 6 (“Although the text of the [World
Heritage] Convention remains constant, its application has changed with the evolving
understanding of heritage conservation theory and practice.”).
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That said, the heritage system is not without need for improve-
ment. Notably, the WHC does not provide any means for dispute resolu-
tion.177 Indeed, part of its wide acceptance has been its “soft law” approach
to preservation.178 Any galactic heritage treaty must, therefore, grapple
with how best to address the enforcement problem. This Article suggests
an approach similar to the Underwater Heritage Convention, whereby Co-
ordinating States (for cultural sites) and the States Parties more gener-
ally (for natural and scientific sites) take it upon themselves to impose
sanctions against wrongdoers.179 In addition, the GHC, like the UHC,
would encourage bilateral and multilateral agreements between states,
particularly spacefaring nations, to protect sites, though no nation would
claim sovereignty.180 The GHC could also require nations to provide regular
reports on their efforts to prevent disturbances to Galactic Heritage Sites,
monitoring those efforts to reinforce the GHC’s mandates.181 In the end,
enforcement of the GHC would rely on strong normative pressures that
have, thus far, proven effective under the World Heritage Convention.
Indeed, a heritage framework likely will prove more effective than
alternatives at the difficult task of enforcing preservation measures in
space. The World Heritage Convention has shown that the risk of defection
can be mitigated by the “blame and shame” of causing a site to be moved
from the World Heritage List to the List of World Heritage in Danger.182
The World Heritage Committee has also demonstrated its capacity to
shape the behavior of sovereign nations through normative pressure.183
177 Vadi, supra note 26, at 129–30.
178 Id. at 129.
179 Underwater Heritage Convention, supra note 13, at art. 17(1).
180 Id. at art. 6.
181 The decision of the 1997 General Assembly of States Parties to mandate periodic reporting
of conservation efforts under the WHC helped “build a systematic approach to understanding
and improving the state of conservation of internationally significant sites.” See CAMERON
& RÖSSLER, supra note 115, at 223; see also CLAIRE CAVE & ELENE NEGUSSIE, WORLD HERI-
TAGE CONSERVATION: THE WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION, LINKING CULTURE AND NATURE
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 254 (2017) (“[A] major success regarding the implementa-
tion of the World Heritage Convention has been the systematic monitoring of sites.”).
182 See Vadi, supra note 26, at 111 (noting that “a number of states have taken action to
prevent delisting [of a World Heritage Site] because of the consequential perceived loss
of reputation”).
183 See id. at 131–32 (citing the example of the City of Cologne eventually rescaling
planned skyscraper projects after pressure from the World Heritage Committee); see also
CAMERON & RÖSSLER, supra note 115, at ch. 6 (“Through key policy and site-specific deci-
sions, the World Heritage system affected the way that heritage values were perceived
and conservation strategies were formulated. . . . Its influence on global practice in cultural
and natural heritage conservation is undeniable.”).
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Likewise, the List of Galactic Heritage in Danger can be used to create
the same reputational pressures that will mitigate the risk of defections,
especially when heritage is viewed as an interest of all humanity. As some
scholars have argued, moreover, the progeny of international heritage law
has established a general international custom that obliges all states to
protect heritage sites.184 Thus, what one could initially view as a weakness
of mirroring the WHC (its soft law approach) may actually prove to be a
strength. That is, by adopting the approach of a widely accepted Treaty,
the GHC can capitalize on custom and wide acceptance as a means of
normative enforcement.185
In addition to enforcement concerns, the cost of protecting galactic
sites is another potential barrier to the GHC’s effective implementation.
It is undeniable that a lack of financial support has hampered preservation
of World Heritage Sites. Although establishing a World Heritage Fund to
help developing nations protect their heritage sites, the WHC has done lit-
tle in the way of substantive support.186 Arguably, preservation of galactic
sites could be even more expensive, given travel costs and other impon-
derables. In reality, however, the Galactic Heritage Sites would be easier
to protect, because: (1) until settlement of space is widespread, protecting
sites will be relatively inexpensive, as states could simply plan in advance
to leave certain areas alone; and (2) those nations and companies with the
ability to disturb galactic sites are also most likely to have the resources
to afford compliance costs.187 Therefore, the GHC would be a low-cost
184 See supra note 172 and accompanying text; see also Vadi, supra note 26, at 120–21
(noting also that protection of cultural heritage has been linked to fundamental human
rights). For an argument that another custom of international law, the precautionary prin-
ciple, provides the impetus for States to avoid harms to galactic environments, see generally
Larsen, supra note 42.
185 Wide acceptance has similarly been key to the Outer Space Treaty’s continued legiti-
macy. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
186 See CAMERON & RÖSSLER, supra note 115, at ch. 6 (opining that “ ‘[t]he level of resourcing
to support World Heritage Sites, particularly in less developed countries, is way behind
what is expected.’ ” (quoting Interview by Christina Cameron and Mechtild Rössler with
Natarajan Ishwaran, U. Montréal, in Paris, Fr. (Mar. 2, 2009))).
187 For example, NASA’s requested budget for Fiscal Year 2019 will be an estimated $19.9
billion, including $10.5 billion for space exploration. NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
FY 2019 BUDGET ESTIMATES Sum-2, Sum-5 (2018), https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default /files
/atoms/files/fy19_nasa_budget_estimates.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2BC-7R93]. Although spend-
ing a much smaller amount (an estimated $2 billion a year in 2015), China’s space program
“has grown roughly 10% a year for the past decade.” Kelly Dickerson, China’s space program
is growing extremely fast, BUS. INSIDER (June 16, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com
/how-big-is-chinas-space-program-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/T9XH-U4TQ]. And, in 2017,
private spaceflight company SpaceX was “valued at around $21 billion, making it one of
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Convention, requiring little expense to preserve sites and pushing any
costs onto those nations and parties most capable of absorbing them. In
fact, there is potential that galactic heritage designations could boost
revenues for private companies by creating space tourism destinations,
offsetting compliance costs and encouraging preservation.188
Undoubtedly, using the WHC and UHC as a framework for galactic
preservation presents an opportunity to begin the important task of regu-
lating human exploitation of celestial bodies. The heritage paradigm allows
nations to take ownership of their own cultural histories, while also ob-
liging states to preserve sites of natural and scientific importance for the
benefit of all humankind. The GHC could take a softer approach, like the
WHC, but that does not mean it would be ineffective. Normative pressures,
coupled with the potential for sanctions, can control potential defectors,
and the exact enforcement mechanisms can be determined at the negoti-
ating table. The GHC’s low cost would also incentivize States Parties to
observe it. Regardless of its enforcement, the Galactic Heritage Convention
proposed in this Article would allow for flexibility in protecting the beauty
and value of our heavenly neighbors, before humans have the chance to
pollute their relatively untampered landscapes.
CONCLUSION
Humans are returning to space. In one way or another, manmade
craft and their crews will soon populate the surface of the Moon, and
even Mars. This exploration will be largely private and will be driven by
the promise of lucrative resources. The resources of our orbital neighbors
will surely improve life here on Earth, but their unbridled extraction
threatens to ruin what we may not yet understand. The intangible and
universal value of scientific discovery, natural beauty, and untouched life
forms hangs in the balance. A treaty is therefore necessary to harmonize
the economic and technological importance of galactic resources with the
cultural, natural, and scientific legacy of space.
the most valuable privately held companies in the world.” Katie Benner & Kenneth Chang,
SpaceX is Now One of the World’s Most Valuable Privately Held Companies, N.Y. TIMES
(July 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/technology/spacex-is-now-one-of
-the-worlds-most-valuable-privately-held-companies.html [https://perma.cc/7CKM-36L6].
188 Cf. CAVE & NEGUSSIE, supra note 181, at 254–55 (describing the positive and negative
impact of tourism on World Heritage Sites and noting the economic incentives of a World
Heritage designation). Tourism might also be a vital part of creating normative pressure
to comply with the GHC. See Cockell & Horneck, supra note 14, at 294 (observing that
“preservation of the Grand Canyon National Park . . . is made possible by encouraging
people to visit and appreciate its splendor and special status”).
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The GHC that this Article proposes takes the structure of heritage
law on Earth and applies it to cosmic worlds. It recognizes the importance
of our own heritage in space and the heritage of celestial bodies in their
own right. The GHC would lay predictable and defined ground rules, a
benefit to commercial and governmental explorers alike. It would work
within the existing no-sovereignty regime of space law by placing the re-
sponsibility for preservation in humanity as a whole and on no one nation
in particular, while giving States Parties input regarding the preservation
of important missions in their spacefaring history. Ultimately, the GHC
would preserve fragile environments and artifacts for uses that benefit hu-
manity and our solar system, taking preservation to infinity and beyond.
